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O presente artigo analisa as regras constitucionais 
pertinentes à remuneração dos juízes brasileiros. O trabalho 
busca investigar as razões que conduziram à criação de 
verbas adicionais – com destaque para o auxílio moradia – 
descaracterizando a previsão constitucional de pagamento 
por meio de subsídio em parcela única. Neste sentido, uma 
breve revisão da teoria dos contratos será efetuada, 
especialmente no que tange às relações de trabalho. 
Proposições relativas à teoria do agente-principal e da 
função de utilidade dos magistrados são levadas em 
consideração. Tais conceitos estão formalizados em um 
problema teórico de controle ótimo, o qual indica os 
incentivos concedidos pelas previsões da Constituição que 
resultaram no congelamento dos subsídios e na instituição 
de verbas adicionais. Por fim, os resultados obtidos 
conduzem a sugestões de alterações normativas buscando 
evitar tais consequências indesejadas. 
ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the constitutional rules regarding the 
remuneration of Brazilian judges. The work aims to 
investigate the reasons that led to the establishment of 
remuneratory perks – the most infamous being the housing 
aid – disregarding the provision of the lump sum 
compensation pay defined in the constitution. In order to do 
so, a brief revision on contract theory is presented, 
especially pertaining to labor relations. Propositions related 
to principal-agent theory and the utility function of 
magistrates are considered. These remarks are rendered in 
an optimum control theoretical model, which indicate the 
incentives given by the constitutional provisions that 
eventually resulted in the freezing of the compensation and 
the institution of additional pays. Finally, the results 
obtained through the model conduct to policy 
recommendations intending to avoid the undesired 
consequences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
he role played by institutions3 and its transformations on the development of nations have 
gained great recognition in the economic science in the past decades (NORTH, 1992). 
Amongst the most relevant institutional features of modern societies, the constitutions 
stand out as one of – if not – the most impacting set of formal rules pertaining to both explain and 
influence individual and collective decision. Therefore, the legal commandments affect the 
economic and social results of any given country. 
Aiming to assess which channels may take legal institutions to positively or negatively 
influence economic growth, Law and Economics has emerged as a pertinent field of study in the 
matter (COOTER and ULSEN, 2012). Inside this field of work, however, there are yet only a few 
studies on the impact of specific constitutional arrangements on public services and general welfare 
(WEIGEL, 2006). 
As stated by Cooter (2000), it is important to note that constitutions, located at the highest 
hierarchy of legal rules, tend to be more generic and harder to change. Hence, amendments usually 
lead to several debates regarding different areas of science – for instance, law, history, philosophy, 
politics, sociology and economics – as they may produce profound impacts in the society. 
Consequently, it becomes crucial to comprehend how constitutional rules and proposed alterations 
can potentially affect the general welfare. 
Brazilian constitution, albeit theoretically classified as rigid, presented several alterations 
since its proclamation in 1988 (BARROSO, 2009). As it contains detailed rules pertaining to 
specific subjects, alterations in society tend to demand constitutional reforms in order to 
approximate the general needs and desires from the formal prescriptions of the legal system. 
When analyzing the constitutional reforms, arguably the most relevant in regard to 
administrative rules and civil service is the amendment 19 of 1998 (BRASIL, 2013, pp. 198-208). 
Among several relevant rules introduced by this act, we can highlight the provision of paragraph 4 
in article 39 (BRASIL, 2013, p. 37), which fixated that judges, prosecutors, and all members of the 
governmental highest branches (president, governors, and mayors) ought to be paid exclusively 
through lump sum compensation, explicitly prohibiting additional perks, bonuses, or any other type of 
pays. Such compensation can only be stipulated and altered through specific law. Additionally, 
article 37, item XI (BRASIL, 2013, p. 35), states that no civil servant in the country can earn wages 
higher than the compensation paid to Supreme Court members4. 
Such provisions intend to give transparency to the remuneration of civil servants at top 
hierarch positions, as well as to avoid unilateral definition of wages by the beneficiaries themselves. 
However, the formal rules were not enough to avoid the creation of different perks through infra-
legal norms, disregarding the explicit commandments of Brazilian constitution. 
The majority of the additional pays take the form of indemnities, given that paragraph 11 
of article 37 exclude such pays from the remuneration ceiling provisioned in the same article. 
Nonetheless, not only many of these pays were created by normative acts other than laws, but 
some are self-denominated indemnities although their nature is clearly remuneratory. 
 
3 The definition of institution follows the proposition made by North (1991, p. 97): Institutions are the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of 
both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal 
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). 
4 Amendment 41 (Brasil, 2013, pp. 253-258) later stipulated lower state and local limits. 
T 
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Currently in Brazil the most infamous example of such practice is the housing aid for 
members of the judiciary branch. In September 2014, Supreme Court judge Luiz Fux proclaimed 
three monocratic decisions guaranteeing a monthly pay of approximately US$ 1,300 for every judge 
and prosecutor in the country to allegedly compensate their expenses with housing. Nevertheless, 
no proof of actual expenditure with rent or similar costs is demanded from the beneficiaries. 
Therefore, such perks represent in fact an increase in the monthly income of judges. 
Apart from legal questions, the matter also produces fiscal impacts. Considering the 
expenditure of federal and state governments, US$ 1,53 billion were allocated for the payment of 
the housing aid from 2014 until the year 2017, according to estimations5. 
Given the previous facts, the current study aims to analyze the indicated form to establish 
the remuneration of judges in Brazil, as well as what may have avoided the implementation of 
current rules. To do so, we will present a brief review of the work developed by Rickets (1986) on 
labor contracts theory, considering the propositions made by Posner (1993). Later, a theoretical 
model on the decision- making variables that led to the institution of the housing aid will be 
introduced. The model leads to the concluding section where we will propose modifications that 
could contribute to avoid the undesired incentives currently observed in Brazil. 
 
 
2. Contract Theory And Remuneration Of Judges 
The current segment will briefly explore what economic theory suggests as the indicated 
way to fix the remuneration of Brazilian judges. In order to do so, the adaptation of contract 
theory based on principle-agent relation presented in Rickets (1986) will be utilized. Those insights 
will be combined with ideas proposed by Posner (1993), especially regarding to the utility function 
of judges. 
Rickets (1986) proposes a different use for the Edgeworth Box – originally used in general 
equilibrium analyses – to demonstrate how risk susceptibility by the agents and principals 
influences the design of optimum risk sharing contracts. 
Principal-agent problems are characterized by presenting agents with utility functions 
negatively affected by the level of effort implemented. Considering that working relations are 
constituted of an employer (principal) offering a contract for an employee (agent) to act on the 
behalf of the later, the author proposes that this approach can be applied when studying labor 
contracts. 
In order to utilize these propositions for the case of judges, we will accept the ideas 
presented in Posner (1993). In this study, the author advocates a change of paradigm regarding 
the idea that magistrates would not respond to incentives. Conversely, although the product of 
their job holds peculiar characteristics, the work concludes that the utility function of judges is 
similar to those of any other individual. This means, among other features, that the function will 
be positively affected by pecuniary retributions and leisure, as well as negatively influenced by the 
effort and number of hours of work6. 
 
5 http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/brazil/2018/03/1960692-lava-jato-judges-do-not-follow- 
strike.shtml, visited in 28th of March, 2018. 
6 Additionally, Posner (1993, pp. 20-21) proposes other variables relating to reputation, popularity, and 
avoiding reversal in superior courts. 
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In the words of Posner (1993, p. 25): 
Rational judges pursue instrumental and consumption goals of the same general 
kind and in the same general way that private persons do. There is no mystery 
as to what they maximize. They maximize a utility function whose principal 
components are readily observable in the behavior of such familiar participants 
in the social enterprise as nonprofit firms, voters, and theatergoers. 
Pertaining to the form of the pecuniary retribution, Posner (1993) indicates that it would 
be treacherous to offer a pay for judges according to the number of sentences produced. That 
would happen once the result of the work of judges cannot be quantified by the number of judicial 
decisions themselves, but needs to be qualified on the basis of the overall justice resulted from the 
decisions. Therefore, these incentives could harm the final product handed to the principal 
(society). 
Through analogy, Posner (1993, pp. 5-9) compares the service provided by magistrates to 
public services which are better executed by non-profit organizations. When the output of an 
assignment is of great interest for the society, but the product itself cannot be promptly evaluated, 
it becomes necessary not to produce incentives which could lead a provider to relegate quality in 
exchange for quantity. In the case of judiciary, a big number of unjust sentences can represent the 
same – or even a worse – result for the society than no decisions. 
Posner (1993, p. 8) recognizes that offering the same payment for judges disregarding the 
level of production makes them less likely to work harder than their peers, but that should not be 
necessarily a problem. Once leisure time can be regarded as a form of remuneration, it enables 
competent individuals to be attracted to judging careers at comparably lower wages than equally 
competent lawyers would demand. 
Following the analytical method proposed by Rickets (1986), the society – principal – must 
offer a contract for the judges – agents – so that the later would act on the interest of the former. 
Hence, the form of monetary compensation should induce the judges to produce fair decisions. 
On the other hand, in order to guarantee a reasonable efficiency, different forms of control can 
be used. These can be ex ante – such as pre-hiring screening – or ex post procedures –.the disclosure 
of statics on sentences delivered, for instance. 
That would also enable the judging careers to attract risk averse individuals, a desirable 
quality for magistrates. Considering the reasonable proposition that the society is also risk averse 
pertaining to justice production, it falls in the situation depicted by Rickets (1986, pp. 237-238). 
When both principal and agent are risk averse, there is no possible contract that will share risks 
efficiently. In other words, the solution will never be first-best. 
Therefore, the second-best solution of offering a contract that does not induce the agent 
to implement maximum effort may, nevertheless, be the efficient solution to the problem, given 
the circumstances aforementioned. In that case, the society would present the judges with a 
contract provisioning fixed compensation as salary, even if that could induce some level of 
shirking. Once the quality of the final product cannot be properly evaluated, giving incentives to 
increase the quantity of sentences would lead to less desirable decisions, a risk the principal is not 
willing to take. 
Based on the ideas presented in the current segment, it is possible to conclude that the 
prescription made by Brazilian constitution regarding paying judges through lump sum 
compensation is in accordance with theoretical propositions on the matter. However, the legal 
provisions failed to deliver the expected results. The next section intends to propose a theoretical 
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indication of some reasons within the rules themselves which may have led to the observed 
consequences. 
 
3. Economic Model For The Choice Of Judges 
Following the ideas presented in the former segment, the current section intends to 
investigate the institutional reasons that led to the disrespect of Brazilian constitutional rules 
regarding the remuneration of judges and equivalent civil servants. 
The proposed optimum control model is based upon the premise that judges act in a similar 
way as any economic agent: they maximize their expected utility in regard to the budgetary 
constraints. However, only the monetary aspects will be considered. We assume that this 
simplification will not impair the results, at the same time as it allows for clearer insights on the 
subject. 
Another implicit idea of the model is that judges have power to  influence on the value and 
characteristics of their own wages. This fact can be seen in Brazil, as judges and prosecutors 
recently performed a one day strike to defend their right to receive extra monthly perks – especially 
the aforementioned housing aid – which are regarded as privileges by the general society and are 
currently being criticized by the media7. 
Therefore, the utility function of the judges would be as follows: 
 
In which u(.) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of the judge twice continually 
differentiable; s(t) indicates the amount received as compensation; i(t) is the indemnities additional 
pays; θ represents the institutional turbulence variable as perceived by the judges; v[t, s(t)] is the average 
earnings of the other civil servants. 
This calls for the first proposed definition: 
Definition 1. θ ∈ (0,1), where values close to 0 indicate that judges recognize the regular 
functioning of institutions and those close to 1 mean institutional turbulence that can be capitalized 
by judges. 
Given the constitutional rules regarding remuneration in Brazilian civil service, the 
following definition can be made. 
Definition 2. The average earning of other careers in civil services v[t, s(t)] varies according to ∂v(. 




their- strike-was-not-solely-about-housing-benefits.shtml, visited in 27th of March, 2018. 
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This leads to the subsequent definitions: 
Definition 3. Once s(t) also represents the remuneratory ceiling for civil servants of all 
governmental careers, it must be true that v[t, s(t)] ≤ s(t), ∀t. 
Definition 4. Considering definition 2 and the fact that some civil servants have their wages 
limited at s(t), increases in the compensation paid to judges automatically raises the wages of high 
level civil servants, but at decreasing rates. So in definition 2 we also have ƒ′(s) > 0, ƒ′′(s) < 0, ∀t. 
Definition 5. There is no restriction for ƒ′(t) in ∂v(. )⁄∂t, once other careers in civil service could 
receive extra salary increases, additional pays, and perks which are prohibited for judges, or v(. ) 
could lose value in time if inflation is higher than replacement rates. 
Gathering the definitions aforementioned, the problem of the judges is presented as 
follows: 
                            (1) 
subject to: s + i + v = b(t); v˙ = ƒ(s) + ƒ(t)                                                               (2)  
and: s, ś, i, v, δ ≥ 0 ∀ t; s(0) = s0; v(0) = v0; i(0) = 0 
 
Considering t = 0,1, …, T; δ as an intertemporal discount rate; b(t) as the available 
governmental budget used to pay civil servants; and b(t) = B ∀ t, in order  to simplify the analysis. 
This implies that the problem faced by judges would be choosing the monetary amount 
of their wages, divided between compensation and indemnities, constrained by the governmental 
fiscal budget channeled to civil service wages. 
A pair of propositions is already possible: 
Proposition 1. If θ = 0, the judges do not extract utility from proposing indemnities as part of 
their monthly salary. 
Proof. The demonstration is straightforward. If θ = 0, ∂u(. ) ⁄ ∂ i = 0 , ∀i, t.  
Proposition 2. Judges do not reduce their utility from increases in the wages of other civil 
servants. In other words, there is no envy on the behalf of the judges in relation to monetary gains 
for other careers in civil service. 
Proof.  Once  again,  the  proof  is  simple  and  direct.  It  stands  that  ∂u(. ) ⁄ ∂v ≥ 0, ∀v, θ, t. 
From proposition 1, it is possible to suppose that a society with functioning democratic 
institutions would use means to avert such proposals, possibly exposing the judges to some level 
of public embarrassment that would offset the monetary gains represented by the perks. 
In regard to the second proposition, it shows that the decisions on the remuneratory 
patterns of the judges do not benefit from reducing the salaries of other careers. On the contrary, 
if the unrealistic absolute institutional chaos represented by θ= 1 is disregarded, the higher the 
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wages of those around them, the higher the resulting utility for the judges. Even if θ=1, there will 
be no direct gains from reductions in the earnings of other civil servants. 
Now, in order to investigate further implications of the model, let us simplify the initial 
problem. 
Firstly, we isolate i in (2): 
                                                           (3) 
Then, substituting (3) in (1) leaves the problem with only one control variable, 
                                    (4) 
Isolating each variable and considering the temporal limit t ∈ (0, T) the problem if left with 
only one control variable and is no longer subject to the budgetary constraint. 
 
(5) 
subject to: v˙  = ƒ(s) + ƒ(t); ƒ′(s) > 0, ∀t                                                                          (6) 
and: s, v, þ ≥ 0 ∀ t; s(0) = s0; v(0) = v0 
It is possible to evaluate the necessary conditions in order to achieve a stable solution, for 
which would be required that s˙ = 0 e v˙ = 0. 
Initially, let us define the hamiltonian function: 
 (7) 
Reallocating the terms in (7), we can write: 
 (8) 
The first order conditions are as follows: 
    (9) 
            (10) 
               (11) 
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The first order conditions indicate the next proposition. 
Proposition 3. In order to get v˙ = 0, it is necessary that 
ƒ(s) = −ƒ(t) , (12) 
which means that the wages in civil service will only be in equilibrium if the impact of the cascade 
effect on higher salaries (resulting from increases in remuneration ceiling) is offset by other 
reductions. 
Proof. From (11), v˙ = 0 implies ƒ(s) + ƒ(t) = 0, or ƒ(s) = −ƒ(t). 
Intending to verify the conditions for stability in the compensation of judges, we need 
to find an equation for s˙. isolating h in (9) results as follows: 
     (13) 
Differentiating (13) in relation to t, lead to 
 
 
which can be written as 
    (14) 
Now, (10) = (14) returns the next relation: 
   (15) 
Multiplying both sides of the equality in (15) by  results in the following: 
 
Isolating makes it possible to write 
     (16) 
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Based on (16), we can see the term in parenthesis and/or ƒ′′(s) need to equal zero  in  order 
= 0.  Given  that ƒ′′ (s) < 0 in  respect  to  definition  4,  this  will happen if and only if to find    
      (17) 
Rearranging the terms leads to the following: 
      (18) 
Also from definition 4, it is known that ƒu(s) > 0. Considering that δ ≥ 0  from (2), the 
following must hold true: 
     (19) 
 
It will be shown that the inequality can only hold in the interval 0,5 < 8 < 1, if we take in 
consideration that 8 ∈ (0,1) from definition 1. That leads to the final two propositions. 
Proposition 4. If institutions are functioning at a reasonable rate, there is no stable solution   for   
the   problem, given   that   whenever   0 < 8 < 0,5,  ƒu(s) < 0,   which disrespects definition 4. 
Proposition 5. As institutional turmoil surpasses certain level (represented by the middle point 8 
= 0,5), it is possible that judges will opt for the equilibrium solution  s∗(t) = s0 and v
∗(t) = v0, as 
the conditions required for s˙ = 0 and v  ̇= 0 become possible. 
Proof.  In order to have a/b > 0,  we  need  a , b  > 0 or  a , b  < 0. Now considering a = 1 − θ 
and b = 2θ − 1, it becomes easy to see that a = 1 − θ > 0 only if 8 < 1, and b = 2θ − 1 > 0 
when θ > 1/2. As a = 1 − θ < 0 needs θ  > 1, which disrespects the definition θ ∈ (0,1), 
a/b > 0 
will only hold true when a , b > 0. That will happen if and only if 0,5 < θ < 1, proofing both 
propositions. 
From proposition 4, we can observe that, when institutions are perceived as regularly 
effective by the judges, there is no definition of their wages that can lead to a stable solution for 
the problem. Therefore, increases in the compensation or indemnities would have to be 
negotiated with the other governmental branches, as the constitution requires that such 
modifications must be made by law. 
Conversely, proposition 5 indicates that institutional turbulence can give incentives for 
judges to avoid increases in their compensation, opting to introduce perks that will not be received 
by other civil servants. That can be explained as a means to avoid rises in the salaries of other 
high hierarch civil service careers that were limited by the constitutional ceiling, granting a bigger 
proportion of the governmental budget for the judiciary. 
The model indicates that the solution seen in proposition 5 do not derive from a 
willingness to reduce the wages from other careers, as such an action would have a negative impact 
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in the expected utility of the judges as well. The fact that any raise in the judicial compensation 
will be automatically granted to other careers, presented in the model through definitions 2 and 
4, seems to be the decisive component  leading to the creation of the additional pays received by 
judges in Brazil. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Law and Economics presents itself as a relevant scientific subject in order to study the 
ways by which the legal features of a given society influence individual actions. Therefore, this 
field is of great value whilst investigating the causes that makes formal rules lead to unexpected – 
and, on many occasions, undesired – results. 
With that in mind, the current work intended to present an analytical model which 
proposedly indicates how Brazilian constitutional features encouraged judges to stipulate an extra 
monthly pay in order to circumvent the remuneratory ceiling stablished by the law. The model 
provided the following insights: 
a. the constitutional provision of a lump sum compensation as the only salary for 
judges was not enough to avoid the creation of other pecuniary pays; 
b. the designation of a remuneration ceiling for civil servants defined as the 
compensation paid for Supreme Court judges allows for automatic raises to 
other high level civil service careers; 
c. given that institutions are perceived as reasonably working, there are lesser 
incentives for judges to propose the creation of extra perks in their wages; 
d. once a certain level of institutional turmoil is overtaken, the constitutional rules 
give greater incentives for judges to freeze their compensation and opt to receive 
other perks; 
e. this last result do not depend on envy or jealousy; on the contrary, it is expected 
even considering that increases in the wages of other careers positively impact 
the utility of judges. 
The results projected by the model appear to be consistent with the events observed in 
Brazil in the past few years. Whilst from 2014 the country was facing arguably the most severe 
recession of its recorded history and the president was fighting an impeachment process, Supreme 
Court judges have not proposed raises  in their compensations since then. Nevertheless, that same 
year marked the decisions which granted every judge in Brazil an extra monthly perk – a housing 
allowance worth more than four times the minimum wage practiced in the country. 
Therefore, it becomes extremely relevant to discuss legal alternatives which should modify 
the current set of incentives given by the constitutional rules pertaining to the subject. The authors 
suggest that the designation of specific monetary ceilings for different civil service careers should 
be a necessary first step in that direction. Such measure would modify definition 2 and eliminate 
definition 4, completely altering the results obtained through the model. 
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